Abstract
In general, there are three modes of making an argument in the arenas of formal knowledge.
Arguably the oldest is an erudite manipulation of texts. Right away we could claim on our side the angriest of classics: People make their own lives, but not necessarily under circumstances of their choosing. These famous (and differently translated) words from Karl Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire might serve as an epigraph to all world-systems biographies.
Another way of proving an argument is abstract modeling. Along with advances in observational technologies this is what generates the hefty prestige of natural disciplines and their self-confident professional ideology of high-consensus, rapid-discovery modern science (Collins 1994) . Perhaps the humanities and social sciences as a whole might never acquire the same rapid-discovery dynamics because of major obstacles presented by their professional and, even more so, political ideologies that cause seemingly endless rounds of re-interpretations.
Nevertheless it seems reasonably predictable that in coming generations, world-systems analysis could move closer to rapid-discovery science, at least in its more technical aspects related to archeology and the comparative study of world-systems, the econometrics of commodity chains, or the mapping of world creativity networks and processes as pioneered by Franco Moretti (1996) and Pascal Casanova (2007) .
Textual erudition and abstract modeling, virtually an antinomy in the light of professional ideologies espoused by the humanities and natural sciences, are both quintessentially elitist demonstrations of intellectual prowess. Therefore both should be pursued by world-systems analysts in their battles to institutionalize their perspective within academia. We can do abstract modeling usefully and more realistically; and we can legitimately boast the intellectual lineage that includes Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter, Nikolai Kondratieff, and Fernand Braudel. Yet a truly formidable intellectual strategy would not only combine scholarly classicism with avantgardism; it should also provide for broadly accessible popularizations. This is what Arthur Stinchcombe (1999) called the "populist" side of social science that helps earn our living in universities by recruiting undergraduate students and appealing to large audiences.
Which brings us to a third mode of making compelling arguments. It is through the tracing of trajectories. In world-systems analysis we are mostly dealing with trajectories, although not of any kind. After all, much of experimental laboratory design aims at altering the trajectories of studied objects in a controlled and repeated manner. This is arguably not what we can do. Our kinds of trajectories are shaped too "naturally" by the many-sided complex interactions among various people and their environments. Terence Hopkins used to deliver this point in his seminars at Binghamton by half-jokingly insisting that world-systems analysis is an environmental science, and therefore our closest kindred spirit must be epidemiology because it traces mutating microbes back to their origins across biological macro-environments. Immanuel Wallerstein, as we know, draws his metaphors of systemic transitions from the "chaos theories" of Ilya Prigogine (Williams 2013) . The biochemical insights about the origins of life also deeply inform the work of John Padgett (Padgett and Powell 2012). For many reasons including its pedagogical value, my own preference might be the magnificent essays of Stephen Jay Gould (1996) tracing the contingently emerging "punctuated equilibria" across developments in the "copious bush of life" as well as in human ideas about natural history.
The analogies between world-systems analysis and environmental sciences point to their shared origin in the theoretical breakthroughs of the late 1960s and the 1970s, or what Wallerstein likes to label with the symbolic date of 1968. This matters not merely in the legitimation of intellectual shifts introduced by a world-systems perspective. It also helps us to grasp better what were those shifts away from a nineteenth-century paradigm of evolving stages and why fundamental perspectives were questioned simultaneously across different areas of knowledge (Lee 2012 Do not neglect to remove scaffolding and reveal the façade once your building is built. Our theoretical debates, specific empirical findings, and technical matters pertaining to methodology should stay relegated to the internal journals and conferences of our sections within professional associations such as PEWS. We should obtain reach and range by writing books for larger external audiences where we cannot be too technical and at the same time we must not hide our key assumptions. In the practice of writing, however, this is never going to be easy. Unlike the authors of conventional biographies who become casually elliptical when referring to historical "background," we have too many things to lay out because background is in fact the stage and structural processes that set up the action and actors.
A big example of both possibilities and pitfalls of world-systems biography is Stephen Kotkin's Stalin (2014) . So far only the first volume of the planned three has come out-and it already stands at nearly 950 pages including two hundred pages of endnotes. Stephen Kotkin boldly invades a very busy terrain. A couple dozen popular biographies of the Soviet revolutionary emperor have appeared in recent years, while more specialist works based on newly available archives count in the hundreds. Kotkin, however, announces a defiantly different approach. Rather than conventionally looking for clues to Stalin's future personality in his childhood and youth (which Kotkin finds fairly unexceptional) or exploring the darker sides of the Russian revolutionary underground and its ideologies that presumably led to later atrocities, Kotkin consciously ignores his main protagonist in the first chapters. Like so many of his contemporaries, the young, poor, and mostly self-educated ethnic Georgian from the periphery of The collapse of the USSR is quite a dramatic puzzle to explain. Within social structures erected through time and space, Shanibov and Gorbachev came to be positioned so their actions could affect in surprisingly major ways the final trajectory of the already teetering Soviet Union.
At a macrohistorical level we are best served by the theoretical tools of world-systems analysis.
They help us to understand the geopolitical and socio-economic consequences of the Bolsheviks, an antisystemic movement capturing a large multi-ethnic state in the semiperiphery of the capitalist world-economy. At the time, the world-economy was undergoing its own hegemonic transition through a series of world wars. The Bolsheviks, or rather their Stalinist inheritors, emerged from the murderous purges of the 1930s and then marched the peoples of the Soviet Union to a tremendous victory in military-industrial confrontation with Nazi Germany, the revanchist failing hegemon (Tooze 2007 After the depredations and catastrophes prior to 1945, the world was moving in some very optimistic directions-and, it seemed, it could move even better and faster with the help of advanced knowledge and political will. This was a truly hegemonic moment in modern history which Hopkins and Wallerstein had experienced at its most central point. They were in the ultracosmopolitan New York and, on top of that, at the intellectual commanding heights of Columbia University's global liberalism during the time when the Ivy League seemed stuck in aristocratic decline and the radical reputation of Berkeley had not yet risen.
Immediately our world-systemic landscape must be extended from the heights of hegemonic America to the energies and political projects emerging across the Third World (Prashad 2007; Westad 2005) . The young Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein all went to Africa amidst pre-independence ferment. This is where they experienced their early conversions. In the proud admission of Terence Hopkins, "Dependency theory came from Latin America; worldsystems analysis had its origins in Africa." Seconded by Giovanni Arrighi: "In Africa it was easier to overcome many illusions; from there we could see the centers of the world better." When Wallerstein acknowledges Frantz Fanon as a life-transforming influence, we must take this seriously.
Before 1968, Wallerstein was on an ascendant trajectory and likely moving into the forefront of American intellectual politics at the time when modernization was its hegemonic project (Gilman 2004) . I suggest that we draw on the sociology of the networks of intellectual creativity and change, a lifelong research project of Randall Collins (1998) new research centers were appearing across the Third World where social science was also acquiring the vector of critical radicalism. From here, it might not be too difficult to explain the rapid discrediting of modernization theory. What could be more difficult is to explain why and how patterns of intellectual contention simultaneously emerged in unrelated disciplines such as "chaos theory" and evolutionary biology, as recent studies show these debates followed analogous logics (Sterelny 2007; York and Clark 2011) .
The greatest difficulty awaits us in explaining the world revolution of 1968. Many commentators, especially in retrospect, did not find it a revolution at all. Charles Tilly omits any discussion of 1968 in his detailed analytical catalogue of revolutions (1992), for evidently revolutionaries who did not patrol the streets for more than a couple of months were not his kind Immanuel Wallerstein is a very astute theorist and prolific writer. He created a generous legacy for us to work with, to expand, and to critically revaluate. Still, there is much more to be done theoretically and empirically regarding the distant past, the present, and especially the moving frontier of our near future. We are now an intellectual movement with fairly strong institutions and recently gaining more young adherents. This is because world-systems analysis is interesting, intellectually refreshing, and stunningly realistic. It is primarily about mapping historical spaces and trajectories. This can and should be done in a combination of different scales, from big and structural to the individual. After all, no global trend can have reality unless observed in local interactions. Likewise, local situations, in all their contingent variety, must add up to something much bigger. We can and should be technical in gathering new data and ruthlessly elitist in academic debates. At the same time, we cannot escape popularization, and here world-systems biography could become a useful versatile form. What we cannot afford to be is boring.
